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The decentralization of political and fiscal authority in Indonesia in 1999 triggered a series of 
studies that predicted the rise of subnational strongmen who would subjugate the local state to their 
personal interests. However, almost 20 years after the devolution of power, Indonesian local politics 
are a lot more dynamic than earlier studies had assumed. While there are undoubtedly oligarchic 
and dynastic tendencies in Indonesian local politics, recent scholarship has emphasized the 
ephemeral nature of such power constellations. This chapter argues that a unique combination of 
institutional and structural conditions explains why local dynasties struggle to survive multiple 
election cycles in Indonesian local politics. The findings also speak to research on subnational 
authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world by showing that different constellations of 
institutional and socio-economic variables shape the rise and fall of local political monopolies. 
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The ephemeral nature of local political monopolies  
Michael Buehler 
The decentralization of political and fiscal authority in Indonesia in 1999 triggered a series of studies that 
predicted the rise of strongmen who would subjugate the local state to their personal interests (see 
Hadiz 2010). Almost 20 years later, such gloomy assessments no longer dominate scholarship on 
Indonesian local politics. While many scholars believe that decentralization has failed to improve service 
delivery and local economic conditions (see Ostwald 2016 et al.), local politics in Indonesia seems to be a 
lot more dynamic than earlier studies had predicted. While there are undoubtedly oligarchic and 
dynastic tendencies in Indonesian local politics (Buehler 2013), recent contributions to the debate have 
emphasized the ephemeral nature of such power constellations (Aspinall and As’ad 2016; Savirani 
2016).1 
Only four election cycles have passed since 1999. It may therefore be too early to reach firm 
conclusions about the relative dynamism of local politics in Indonesia. However, recent claims that 
Indonesian dynasties struggle to survive multiple election cycles are suggestive enough to examine the 
potential reasons for this dynamism more in depth. As most existing studies on Indonesian local 
dynasties are merely descriptive in nature, it is useful to look at the broader theoretical literature on 
local political monopolies first.2 
Literature review 
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The literature on the durability of local political monopolies falls into two broad groups: the first body of 
works emphasizes the importance of local economic conditions, while the second body of works argues 
that institutional conditions determine the longevity of local political monopolies. 
Economic conditions and enduring local political 
monopolies 
In The Sources of Social Power, Michael Mann argued that chieftains only managed to establish enduring 
authority in parts of the world where the local topography allowed them to encage the population. The 
agricultural surplus that could be expropriated under such conditions then became the nucleus of 
enduring political systems (Mann 1986: 80). Similarly, McMann (2006) argued that local socio-economic 
conditions determine to what degree citizens can oppose the monopolization of power in Russian local 
politics. Montero (2011) stated that demographic conditions, poverty levels, and linkages to urban 
centers determine whether local incumbents can concentrate power in Brazil. Lankina and Getachew 
(2012) claimed that education levels resulting from Christian missionary activities increased the level of 
human capital in some but not other Indian provinces and therefore explain the variance of subnational 
authoritarianism across the country. 
The aforementioned literature finds its counterparts in several works on Southeast Asia. Ockey 
(1998: 40) and McVey (2000: 12), for instance, both argued that “local godfathers” and “rural big men” 
came to power in Thai provinces in the 1970s after economic changes acquired political relevance in the 
context of the (re-)introduction of parliamentary democracy. For the Philippines, Anderson (1988) 
argued that the concentration of local landholdings gave birth to durable local political monopolies. 
Similarly, McCoy showed that “a single national highway” in Ilocos Sur province gave rise to a local 
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strongman while “the highway grid that crisscrosses the [Central Luzon] plain lacked comparable choke 
points,” which subsequently prevented the monopolization of local politics in that part of the Philippines 
(2009: 15). The case that local economic conditions determine the durability of local political 
monopolies has been made most forcefully by Sidel (2014), who argued that  
[v]ariance in subnational authoritarianism corresponds to local constellations of 
economic power, with subnational authoritarian rulers’ success in entrenching and 
perpetuating themselves in power contingent on their ability to constrain the economic 
autonomy of citizens, voters, local state agents, vote-brokers, and would-be challengers. 
By this logic, local economic conditions are determinant of local political outcomes. 
(2014: 165)3  
In other words, wherever local economic conditions create “locked-in electorates” (Scott 1969: 1146, ftn 
16) and “pliable populations” (Hale 2003: 229), namely voters who depend economically on local elites, 
chances are high that local elites leverage these dependencies into local political monopolies. 
However, elites do not simply encounter local economic conditions but often actively construct 
them when trying to establish stable local political monopolies. Often, local elites do so with the help of 
outsiders. Hale (2003), Erie (1988), and Schneider and Schneider (2003) showed the importance of 
intergovernmental alliances for the establishment of durable local political monopolies in Russia, the 
United States, and Italy.  
[T]his scholarship suggests that accumulation, concentration, and monopolisation of 
economic control over a given locality are determined not only by the factor 
endowments and inherited economic structures of a given locality, but also through 
interactions between local powerbrokers and supra-local state authorities. 
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(Sidel 2014: 169). 
Furthermore, the durability of local political monopolies is shaped by  
the form of economic control achieved and maintained by subnational authoritarian 
rulers . . . [S]ubnational authoritarianism is only viable in the long term insofar as 
proprietary wealth and predominance in a local economy of a subnational authoritarian 
ruler are solidly rooted in property rights in the private economy. 
(Sidel 2014: 179) 
In short, if local politicians can establish local economic monopolies that are based on secure 
property rights, proprietary wealth, and the private legal realm of the market and if these local 
economic monopolies create sizeable locked-in electorates, local politicians are well-positioned to 
establish enduring local political monopolies. In contrast, if local politicians depend on privileged access 
to state resources, rely on the discretionary enforcement of state regulatory powers, and are 
predominantly involved in illegal economic enterprises, they will struggle to establish enduring 
economic monopolies (Sidel 2014: 179). The lack of complete control over their economic monopoly 
makes their local political monopoly more vulnerable to adversarial outside attacks. 
The literature emphasizing the importance of economic local conditions for the presence and 
persistence of local political monopolies can be criticized on several grounds. Since Sidel has most 
emphatically argued that economic conditions explain the durability of local political monopolies, the 
following paragraph focuses mainly on his theory. While Sidel differentiates clearly between natural 
private sector monopolies (1) and private sector monopolies that are created (2), he does not 
differentiate clearly enough between private sector resources that are created and economic resources 
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that are based on state-patronage (3), that is economic resources that flow directly from the state 
including the “allocation of state budgets and awarding of state loans” (Sidel 2014: 168). He also 
conflates economic resources and resources that seem to have only institutional origins (4), such as 
“preferential treatment by . . . law-enforcement agencies [and] tolerance of electoral fraud and violence, 
and punitive treatment of rival candidates” (Sidel 2014: 169). Sidel also does not consider explicitly that 
many economic conditions deemed important for the creation of durable political monopolies are often 
a function of a country’s institutional context. For instance, secure property rights, which are mentioned 
by Sidel as an important prerequisite for establishing enduring local economic monopolies, are, arguably, 
determined by a state’s overall regulatory framework and how strictly and impartially it is enforced. 
In short, the fact that many economic resources flow directly from the state, the fact that many 
resources have institutional roots, and the fact that even economic assets in the private sector may be a 
function of administrative powers suggests that enduring political monopolies may be established 
entirely through the monopolization of resources that have their origins in a country’s institutional 
framework. 
Institutional conditions and enduring local political 
monopolies 
A growing literature has emphasized the importance of institutional conditions for the emergence of 
durable local political monopolies. This research strand has been initiated by Gibson, who argued that 
local political monopolists in nationally democratic countries are challenged by “regime juxtaposition” 
(Gibson 2012: 5). Since the local political monopoly is undemocratic but national-level politics are 
democratic, local political monopolists have to find ways to fend off attacks to their local dominance by 
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national-level democratizers or by adversarial alliances between national and local democratizers. In 
both scenarios, the fate of local political monopolies is determined by how effectively incumbents 
control the boundaries to their jurisdiction. 
The defense capacities of local monopolists are determined by institutional conditions, namely 
whether a political system is centralized or decentralized, whether provinces are represented in national 
politics relatively symmetrically or asymmetrically, and how much power a country’s institutional 
framework assigns to government players situated at administrative layers below a local political 
monopoly (Gibson 2012: 149). 
Expanding on Gibson’s work, Giraudy (2015) argued that a combination of fiscal and political 
powers determines the durability of local political monopolies in nationally democratic countries. For 
example, the size of local fiscal deficits, levels of indebtedness, and the possibility to raise taxes at the 
subnational level define the fiscal autonomy of local autocrats. If local fiscal deficits and indebtedness 
are high while possibilities to collect local revenues are scarce, local autocrats have only weak fiscal 
powers to resist outside attacks. Furthermore, if the party the national executive government head 
belongs to is highly institutionalized and enjoys high party discipline, outside attacks are more likely to 
be successful than if these conditions are absent. 
To summarize, this literature emphasizes that local political monopolies do not simply “emerge” 
from local economic conditions but are actively constructed through manipulating and bypassing 
institutions. In other words, there is nothing preordained about local political monopolies and they are 
decisively non-local in origin. 
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Several critiques can be levelled against this second body of works. First, the potential role local 
economic conditions play for the rise and survival of local political monopolies is either ignored outright 
(Gibson 2012) or insufficiently ruled out (Giraudy 2015). Second, these authors also do not address that 
many of the institutional conditions said to determine the emergence and durability of local political 
monopolies, such as party institutionalization and party discipline, may themselves be economically 
conditioned.4 Third, and most important, aforementioned research on the institutional determinants of 
local political monopolies is dominated by Latin American experts (Gibson 2012; Giraudy 2015; 
Gervasoni 2010; Weitz-Shapiro 2015 and various chapters on South America in Behrend and Whitehead 
2016). It therefore focuses almost exclusively on federal democracies, which are the dominating political 
system in the Americas. 
Most countries in the world are unitary states, however. While unitary states show varying 
degrees of decentralization, they all have in common that the possibilities for institutional rigging by 
subnational political players are much more limited compared to federal democracies. Yet, local political 
monopolies flourish in such countries too. In fact, there is considerable variance within these 
decentralized unitary states with regard to the emergence and durability of local political monopolies 
despite the fact that such territorial regimes are much more homogenous and national-level control 
over subnational entities is usually considerable. 
In short, there may be a selection bias in findings that local political monopolies are exclusively 
based on institutional manipulation because most of this research focuses on a region of the world were 
political systems that are conducive to institutional rigging are prevalent. The great leeway local 
incumbents in federal democracies have with regard to shaping institutions in their favor allowed 
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scholars working on federal democracies in the Americas to dismiss local economic conditions too 
quickly. 
In the remaining paragraphs, I want to show that combining these two literatures will result in 
an approach with increased explanatory power. Concretely, I argue that whether a country is a 
decentralized unitary state or a federal democracy determines whether economic conditions 
endogenous to localities or institutional conditions exogenous to localities acquire causal primacy in the 
rise and durability of local political monopolies. In federal democracies, local political monopolies may 
emerge irrespective of whether local economic conditions lend themselves to elite dominance and the 
creation of locked-in electorates, because the federal regulatory framework facilitates institutional 
rigging of the kind described above. This allows local incumbents to establish monopolies based entirely 
on political resources. Despite the fact that such monopolies may be somewhat detached from local 
conditions and therefore “built in the air,”5 they may nevertheless be durable. Said differently, one does 
not need to “lock-in” the electorate if one can manipulate the election law or the boundaries of 
electoral districts. 
In decentralized unitary states, however, opportunities for institutional rigging are much less 
available to local incumbents compared to federal democracies. This shifts the focus to local economic 
conditions as determinants of local political monopolies. In jurisdictions where local economic 
conditions have created locked-in electorates and where elites have monopolized the private sector 
economy, there is a high chance that local political monopolies may emerge even though institutions 
cannot be easily manipulated. If locked-in electorates are created through intra-state alliances and if 
economic monopolies depend on elites’ access to the state, local monopolies are more fragile. These 
two different economic contexts explain the emergence of enduring local monopolies and single-
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generation local monopolies within decentralized unitary states, as Sidel has pointed out (2014). Finally, 
in countries where elites struggle to dominate local economies, where the economic autonomy of local 
voters is relatively high, and where the regulatory framework makes institutional rigging difficult, local 
political monopolies are less likely to emerge and survive multiple election cycles. Arguably, this is the 
case in Indonesia, to which I turn now. 
Indonesia 
Political monopolies are either absent or ephemeral in Indonesian local politics because of two inter-
related reasons. First, local economic conditions do not lend themselves to monopolization. Hence, local 
elites struggle to dominate local economies and the economic autonomy of Indonesian voters is 
comparatively high. Second, the institutional framework of Indonesia’s decentralized unitary state 
creates formidable obstacles for local incumbents to rig institutions in their favor. 
While space constraints make it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of economic and 
institutional conditions said to facilitate the rise and survival of local political monopolies, the following 
paragraphs will elaborate briefly on some of the points mentioned in the literature review to illuminate 
why local politics in Indonesia remain relatively dynamic. 
Indonesian elites struggle to monopolize private sector 
resources 
Many democratizing countries are in the Global South, where a large proportion of the electorate works 
in the agricultural sector. The concentration of land in the hands of a small elite has created tenant 
farmers whose livelihood depends on landed elites. This has often given rise to political monopolies. In 
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addition to taking advantage of monopolies inherent to the private sector economy in a given locality, 
successful local political monopolists have also used the powers of their office to actively create 
economic monopolies in the private sector as mentioned before. Such strategies included “control over 
commodity processing centers, markets [and] transportation chokepoints” (Sidel 2014: 169), as well as 
the use of insider knowledge and political connections to rig the privatization of state-owned enterprises 
in the manufacturing and heavy industry (Hale 2003: 249). The allocation of concessions for the 
exploitation of natural resources to allies, friends, and family members, as well as licenses and permits 
for infrastructure projects on which local economies depend, including bridges, toll roads, ports, and 
railway tracks, have been used to structure private sector economic assets in favor of the incumbent. 
In addition to economic power concentration in the hands of an individual politician or a small 
group of politicians, the rise and endurance of local political monopolies is also determined by the 
economic autonomy of the electorate. In other words, the lack of an “exit” option for local voters in a 
jurisdiction where an individual or a small group of individuals have managed to monopolize key 
economic assets is another important determinant of local political monopolies. One may think that the 
economic autonomy of local electorates is simply a function of the presence of local economic 
monopolies. However, local economic monopolies may exist while the livelihoods of the majority of the 
electorate remain unaffected by such monopolists. Under such conditions, citizens are therefore able to 
cast freely their ballot on Election Day. In short, it is both the presence and prevalence of elite control 
over the local economy that determines the economic autonomy of voters.6 Neither inherited private 
sector economic monopolies nor created economic monopolies are sufficient to establish local political 
monopolies if the economic autonomy of voters remains high (Sidel 2014: 167). 
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In Indonesia, it is difficult for local elites to take advantage of natural monopolies or to 
monopolize local economies in the way described above. In addition, the economic autonomy of voters 
is relatively high. Concretely, while the quality of data on landownership in Indonesia is notoriously poor, 
land concentration overall seems to be less prevalent than in other Southeast Asian countries. While 
there is great variation in land concentration within Indonesia (Hefner 1993: 55), the largest 
concentration of land exists in those parts of Indonesia where the plantation economy looms large 
(Safitri 2012). However, many of these plantations are under the ownership of national elites (Tans 2012: 
17) and therefore do not provide local elites with leverage over the electorate. About 30% of the 
plantation sector also consists of small holdings, which explains the fragmented nature of the plantation 
industry in many parts of the archipelago (Rist et al. 2010: 1112). Finally, provinces and districts receive 
only a small amount of revenues and export taxes these estates generate (Tans 2012: 58). In areas 
where there is an above average concentration of land in the hands of local players, these pockets of 
land concentration are often too small to serve as a basis to control significant parts of the electorate. In 
West Java province, for instance, the higher than usual concentration of landownership (Pincus 1996) is, 
arguably, neutralized by the population density of the province, which is among the world’s highest. 
Most important, however, the diversification of the rural economy in much of Indonesia since the 1970s 
(Hart 1986: 192–212) and the accompanying “seasonal or circulatory migration to urban centers or 
periurban industrial zones (White 1991: 63) has dramatically reduced the importance of landholdings as 
a source of political power in past decades. 
In short, in areas where land concentration is pronounced, the land is often owned by political 
players with no interest in establishing local political monopolies. If local economic monopolies in the 
agricultural and plantation sector exist, they are not capturing enough of the local economy to lock-in 
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sizeable numbers of voters. Finally, the proliferation of new employment opportunities in the country’s 
rural areas has contributed to the relative economic autonomy of Indonesian voters. 
With regard to state patronage, corruption and collusion are certainly prevalent in the allocation 
of licenses and business permits in the natural resource sector. This has not only generated enormous 
profits for local political elites but also often allowed them to become important economic players or at 
least interlocutors between local business interests. However, natural resource exploitation does not 
lend itself to the creation of local economic monopolies that could be turned into local political 
monopolies. While Law No. 22/ 1999 initially provided local government with the authority to issue 
licenses for the logging and plantation industry, this was partially revoked three years later when 
government regulation PP No. 34/ 2002 shifted authority over timber permits back to the national 
Ministry of Forestry (McCarthy 2007). The national government has also used its legal powers to redraw 
forest boundaries in order to bring more forests under its direct control, thereby depriving local 
governments of logging opportunities (Tans 2012: 59). 
Likewise, large-scale industrialization is absent in Indonesia. Most of the few sizeable industrial 
assets are in the extractive industry and are either state-owned enterprises under national leadership, 
joint ventures with foreign companies, or under the control of Chinese-Indonesians, who, for historical 
reasons, constitute a class of pariah capitalists who rarely directly engage in politics. Local mining 
operations are either too fragmented or too small (Aspinall 2001) to allow local elites involved in such 
operations to leverage this into political might. With regard to the manufacturing industry, foreign 
investment in Indonesia’s manufacturing industry was always low compared to other Southeast Asian 
countries (Thomsen 1999). At the time of writing, the sector only employs around 21% of Indonesia’s 
workforce. The largest manufacturing clusters are in Bandung, Jakarta, Medan, and Surabaya, but there 
8 The ephemeral nature of local political monopolies 
 
are almost no single-company towns (Rothenberg et al. 2016) of the kind that have given rise to local 
political monopolies in countries such as Russia. In fact, most monopolies in the “good producing 
industries . . . were eliminated” after the fall of Soeharto, while links between the manufacturing 
industry and the political establishment largely disappeared after 1998, resulting in “reduced capture” 
(Kochanova et al. n.y: 7). 
Finally, other state patronage resources with the potential to create locked-in electorates are 
welfare contributions. While a rudimentary welfare state has developed over the past years in Indonesia, 
the level of welfare services on offer is not anywhere near the welfare resources available for potential 
politicization in former post-communist countries. Most Indonesians continue to rely on private savings 
and family networks when it comes to health and welfare concerns. 
In short, the lack of natural private sector monopolies, the absence of large-scale 
industrialization, the fragmentation of the manufacturing industry, and the insignificance of social 
services for the livelihoods of Indonesians have resulted in an electorate that remains poor but is also 
relatively free from economic dependencies. 
However, as shown, scholars have argued that even if local elites are unable to make use of 
natural or created private sector economic monopolies, as well as state patronage, politicians may still 
be able to establish political monopolies through the concentration of institutional resources. Yet, the 
institutional framework of Indonesia’s unitary state provides limited opportunities for politicians in that 
respect too. 
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Institutional constraints on local political monopolies 
Research emphasizing the monopolization of political resources through the manipulation of institutions 
has pointed out that in highly decentralized federal democracies local incumbents have rigged 
constitutions and electoral rules to their advantage and also manipulated fiscal and regulatory 
frameworks to either fill their own campaign coffers or to starve off adversarial jurisdictions situated at 
lower rungs of the institutional hierarchy. In addition, the power to collect and allocate local revenues 
and to manipulate local indebtedness have all been mentioned as institutional conditions that have 
shaped the rise and fall of local political monopolies (Gibson 2012; Giraudy 2015). 
In Indonesia, however, the decentralized unitary state framework places serious restrictions on 
the monopolization of institutional resources. For instance, certain amendments to the electoral rules 
can be made by local governments, but the overall framework regulating local elections is standardized 
across the country and under the authority of the national election commission (Buehler 2010). 
Furthermore, unlike in federal democracies, Indonesian local incumbents cannot write their own local 
constitutions. Consequently, while local incumbents in federal democracies, such as Argentina or Mexico, 
have written their own constitution to, among other issues, bring the security apparatus stationed in 
their jurisdiction under their control, the police and the army are under national authority in Indonesia 
(Kristiansen and Trijono 2005: 237). Likewise, the public prosecutor’s office reports to the national level, 
not the local government (Tans 2012: 14). In short, while there is certainly a fair level of collusion 
between local governments, the local security apparatus, and the judiciary in many localities, Indonesian 
local incumbents cannot bring these political resources under their formal control. Local political 
monopolies dependent on such institutional resources are therefore unlikely to be enduring, as they are 
at constant risk of national government intervention. 
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Local incumbents face similar obstacles with regard to the manipulation of fiscal resources and 
budget allocations. After 1998, local governments adopted hundreds of predatory taxes and levies. At 
the same time, local governments have systematically syphoned off tax revenues that were supposed to 
go to the national level (Buehler 2009a). However, as part of a re-centralization campaign under the 
Megawati and Yudhoyono administrations, Law No. 32/ 2004 and Law No. 28/ 2009 confined the 
number of levies local governments can adopt to 11 taxes (Buehler 2009b). Hence, at the time of writing, 
local taxation generated only around 10% of the income of local jurisdictions (Ostwald et al 2016: 140).7 
Furthermore, the capacity of the Indonesian government to collect taxes is so weak that the country has 
one of the lowest tax compliance ratios in the world (Rahman 2017: 2). All this makes predatory levies 
and the diversion of tax proceeds a blunt tool for the creation of economic monopolies that could be 
turned into political monopolies. 
With regard to the manipulation of budget allocations, Indonesian localities receive on average 
90% of their revenues from the national level through block grants (DAU – Dana Alokasi Umum) and 
special allocation grants (DAK – Dana Alokasi Khusus). While there is a lot of corruption and collusion in 
intra-governmental budget transfers, the formal allocation mechanism is determined by a standardized 
regulatory framework under the control of the national level (Brodjonegoro and Martinez-Vazquez 
2005). This confines the possibilities of Indonesian local elites to manipulate budget allocations to the 
degree possible in federal democracies. 
Hiring friends and supporters into the local bureaucracy has been mentioned as another tactic 
to establish local political monopolies. The democratization after 1998 has definitely politicized the local 
state apparatus. Because there are no local economic monopolies that could serve as a stepping-stone 
for establishing local political monopolies, the state has become the most integrated tool available for 
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campaigns in most Indonesian localities. Consequently, the majority of candidates running for governor, 
district head or mayor hail from within the bureaucracy, turning local executive government head 
elections essentially into intra-state competition in many districts. 
In this context, bureaucrats running in local elections have resorted to using state 
administrations under their control to campaign on their behalf during election season (Kompas 2005). 
Local incumbents have also tried to streamline local bureaucracies by promoting, demoting, and 
transferring local bureaucrats either before or after elections (Ngusmanto 2016) and to expand their 
electoral vehicle by spending excessive amounts of the local budget on administrative upkeep rather 
than service delivery (Sjahrir et al. 2013). Finally, bureaucrats have tried to generate resources by selling 
posts in the local administration (Kristiansen and Ramli 2006). 
However, the politicization of the local state apparatus does not automatically translate into 
political power. While the Indonesian bureaucracy is bloated, the number of people working in the 
apparatus is small compared to other Southeast Asian countries because of Indonesia’s high population 
density (Buehler 2011: 66). The percentage of the population that directly or indirectly depends on the 
local state is therefore insufficient to establish political monopolies. In other words, too many people 
are independent from the state for control over the local state apparatus to yield political leverage 
sufficiently strong to establish a local political monopoly. The authority of the national government to 
impose hiring freezes on local administrations and to request five-year placement plans, powers that 
Jakarta has used in the past, confines the possibilities to co-opt local bureaucracies further (Kompas 
2011). Finally, nationwide term limits for local executive government heads add another obstacle to 
monopolization of bureaucratic power in Indonesia. In short, the rigid structures of Indonesia’s 
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decentralized unitary state constrain the development of durable local political monopolies based on 
the concentration of institutional resources. 
In addition to these economic and institutional obstacles to establishing local political 
monopolies, the broader political context makes it difficult for local politicians to influence national 
politics in their favor. The major links between national and subnational politics in federal democracies, 
such as Argentina and Mexico, where incumbents rely on manipulating national institutions to establish 
local political monopolies are political parties. However, in Indonesia, political parties are poorly 
institutionalized. Furthermore, party internal hierarchies are top heavy. Therefore, parties do not 
provide local elites with access to national politics to the same degree as in Argentina or Mexico. 
Conclusion 
This chapter argued that existing works on local political monopolies may suffer from selection bias, as 
they either focus on decentralized unitary states or federal democracies. In the former, economic 
conditions may indeed explain the variance in subnational authoritarianism. In the latter, the 
possibilities for institutional rigging may explain better the rise and durability of local political 
monopolies than economic conditions intrinsic to jurisdictions. I have argued that both economic and 
institutional conditions need to be taken into account to explain the presence or absence of local 
political monopolies. In Indonesia, the economic autonomy of voters is relatively high, while the 
possibilities for institutional manipulation are relatively low. Arguably, this combination explains the 
ephemeral nature of Indonesia’s local political monopolies. 
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There are four main power bases on which local political monopolies can be established, as 
mentioned. Since private sector economic monopolies, inherited (1) or created (2), are not widespread 
and because institutional resources (4) are also not as easily captured by local elites compared to federal 
democracies, the selective distribution of state-patronage (3) is where Indonesian local elites seem to 
have the most freedom to manipulate the system in their interest. If local political monopolies emerge 
in Indonesia, they will therefore likely be based on the concentration and subsequent dispersion of state 
patronage. 
However, collusive practices with regard to logging licenses, the diversion of plantation 
revenues and other tax proceeds, the adoption of predatory taxes, and the particularistic delivery of 
services to select constituencies are all against the law, therefore necessarily informal and subject to 
constant re-negotiations and potential outside intervention. Term limits for local executive government 
heads add to these obstacles, as regular transition periods allow national elites to renege on informal 
arrangements. In short, local political monopolies may emerge in Indonesian politics, but they are 
unlikely to be very durable because risks of outside intervention are high. 
Against this backdrop, the dynastic nature of existing local political monopolies and the 
prevalence of money politics in local elections are not to be seen as indicators for the growing 
entrenchment of particularistic interests but as indicators for the rather unstable basis of local political 
monopolies across the archipelago state. Since locked-in electorates are largely absent in Indonesia, 
politicians trying to establish local political monopolies are always confronted with the risk that voters, 
vote-canvassers, and power brokers will take their money and run. Local elites therefore rely on family 
and clan networks to minimize the risk of defection. Similarly, the prevalence of money politics in 
Indonesian local politics should be seen as an indicator for the relative dynamism of local politics. 
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Indonesian politicians need to engage in money politics because they cannot coerce voters to support 
them at the ballot box. Locked-in electorates, in other words, would not have to be paid for electoral 
support, as they have no other option than to vote for the candidate on whom they depend 
economically. 
While it may look like the ephemeral nature of Indonesian local monopolies bodes well for the 
democratization of Indonesian politics, the absence of local authoritarianism does not automatically 
translate into progressive and democratic politics. While predatory elites struggle to entrench 
themselves in local politics, so do progressive politicians. As Trounstine (2008) has shown, successful 
reformers rely on monopolistic government arrangements as much as local bosses. More likely then, the 
scenario for future local politics in Indonesia is one where different predatory networks and local mafias 
will jostle for power and the support of the electorate without providing much in terms of policy 
agendas that would address the country’s many problems. 
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1 There is no doubt that only a sliver of Indonesian society has the means to compete in local executive 
and legislative elections. Indonesian politics remain elite-dominated. However, the point made here is 
that power dynamics within this elite are more competitive than scholars had expected when Indonesia 
decentralized its political and fiscal structures. 
2 The burgeoning literature on local strongmen, dynasties, oligarchies, and subnational autocratic 
regimes all have in common that they focus on power constellations in which competition is confined. I 
therefore call such power constellations “local political monopolies.” 
3 Emphasis added. 
4 Panebianco (1988) showed how economic structures may shape party discipline in the long run. 
Buehler (2012) applied this argument to the Indonesian context. 
5 In contrast to Democratic machines, Republican machines in the United States were built “in the air” 
Lincoln Steffens pointed out in his classic study of American political machines, “The Shame of the Cities,” 
published in 1904. 
8 The ephemeral nature of local political monopolies 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 Of course, local economies may be completely monopolized, but voters remain relatively autonomous 
because their livelihoods do not depend on the private sector but state resources, such as welfare 
programs that are under the control of the national government. 
7 In April 2017, the Indonesian Supreme Court struck down Article 251 in Law No. 23/ 2014 on Regional 
Governance. Article 251 allowed governors and ministers to revoke district regulations that were 
violating provincial and national law. This means that the notoriously slow and corrupt Supreme Court is 
now the only institution that can revoke local regulations. De facto, this has empowered district 
government heads. 
